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A PROPOSED REMEDY FOR
MISSISSIPPI'S MEDICAL MALPRACTICE MISERIES
Jeffrey O'Connell*
I. INTRODUCTION**
Analysts and reporters across the globe have deemed Mississippi a "legal hell-
hole."' While plaintiffs' attorneys remain steadfast in their belief that tort reform
is not the answer in Mississippi's medical malpractice misery,2 doctors across the
state claim that they have no choice but to leave the state because they can no
longer afford malpractice insurance premiums.3 The Mississippi Insurance
Commissioner has stated that more than seventy insurance companies have
stopped issuing policies in Mississippi.4 Plaintiffs' attorneys assert that greed
motivates the insurance companies and note that only two percent of all cases
filed in Circuit Court last year were medical malpractice cases.'
Nonetheless the U.S. Chamber of Commerce launched a full-scale campaign
for tort reform in Mississippi in May 2002.6 The Chamber stated that they would
"do everything they can to change the state's deeply flawed legal system."7 The
Chamber, the world's largest business federation,8 relies on a Harris Interactive
poll of more than 800 attorneys who rated Mississippi as the lowest ranking state
in judicial fairness.' Whereas the Chamber views tort reform as the only solution
to save Mississippi's "flawed legal system," data on median compensatory
awards from across the nation purport to show that Mississippi is in fact below
the national median and nineteen of the forty-four states that reported have a
higher median.'I
Mississippi's legislators entered a special session on September 5, 2002, to
address the issue of high medical malpractice premiums and tort reform. Thirty-
two days later, on October 7, 2002, the legislature finally agreed on House Bill 2,
which was passed and signed by Governor Ronnie Musgrove. House Bill 2
among other things set forth the following "cures" for the crisis."
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* Non-economic damages in medical malpractice cases filed on or after
January 1, 2003, will be capped at $500,000. This amount will increase to
$750,000 in 2011 and to one million dollars in 2017. Punitive and actual
damages were not capped.
* Venue for medical malpractice cases will be in the county where the
alleged cause of action occurred.
* Statute of limitations for cases against nursing homes was decreased from
three years to two years.
* Joint and several liability issues were tackled by holding defendants
responsible for their percentage of fault in pain-and-suffering awards.
* In cases involving medication-related errors, doctors who prescribe and
pharmacists who dispense U.S. Food and Drug Administration approved
drugs will be immune from lawsuits filed against drug manufacturers.
12
All of these provisions either make it harder for injured patients to be paid or
pay them less when they are paid. This is hardly even-handed reform of a legal
system. Rather, it is a system that is hard on both patients and health care
providers. And ironies of ironies, according to Neil Vidmar's careful piece on




The current medical malpractice tort regime not only fails in promoting the
goal of safety, but also often fails to live up to the tort system's own prime goal --
justly compensating victims of medical error." According to a Harvard study,
only one in eight negligently injured plaintiffs files a tort claim, and only one in
sixteen negligently injured plaintiffs is eventually compensated. 6 Even if a vic-
tim is successful in accessing the tort system, the average tort lawsuit reaches
trial years after it is filed. 7 An injured plaintiffs financial needs are probably
most dire during this delay, as lost wages, medical bills, and low morale begin to
take their toll. Even if the case never reaches trial, studies show that delays are
long and the system's transaction costs consume half or more of all the dollars
that defendants pay in tort settlements and verdicts. 8 Indeed, up to forty percent
of any award is immediately diverted to a plaintiffs own attorney fees.1
As Harvard Law School Professor Paul Weiler notes, when it comes to just
compensation the current malpractice regime "has major flaws."2 As tort bene-
fits are "doled out in a rather arbitrary manner to some--but not most--deserving
12. Id.
13. Neil Vidmar, Tort Reform and the Medical Liability Crisis in Mississippi: Diagnosing the Disease
and Prescribing a Remedy, 22 Miss. C. L. REV. (forthcoming Fall 2002).
14. The remaining portions of this article are excerpted and adapted from Jeffrey O'Connell and Patrick
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15. See PETER A. BELL & JEFFREY O'CONNELL, ACCIDENTAL JUSTICE: THE DILEMNAS OF TORT LAW 51
(1997).
16. Jeffrey O'Connell & James E Neale, HMOs, Cost Containment, and Early Offers. New Malpractice
Threats and a Proposed Reform, 14 J. CONTEMI'. HEALTH L. & POL'Y 287, 294 (1998).
17. BELL, supra note 15, at 59.
18. BELL, supra note 15, at 67.
19. O'Connell, supra note 16, at 295.
20. Paul C. Weiler, The Case for No-Fault Medical Liability, 52 MD. L. REV. 908, 915 (1993).
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victims, and also to those who are not even 'deserving' within tort law's fault-
based frame of reference."21 According to one source, fifty percent of plaintiffs'
attorneys see little or no evidence of malpractice in more than half of the cases
they themselves file.' As a result, the current system often undercompensates
deserving claimants (especially the more seriously injured), while it grossly over-
compensates other claimants (often the less seriously injured).
Most serious disputes about damages in tort law focus not so much on pay-
ments for actual economic damages, such as lost wages and medical expenses,
but on the validity of payments for non-economic or intangible harms.23
Traditionally tort law purported to award plaintiffs money for the "pain and suf-
fering" that accompanied their physical injuries. Today, damages for pain and
suffering may also include compensation for the despair, humiliation, and "loss
of life's pleasures" or so-called "hedonic damages" that result from a bodily
injury.24 Although the law recognizes that no precise dollar value can automati-
cally be placed on physical and psychological hurt, non-economic damages gen-
erally rise with economic damages." This potential for high awards can often
result in needlessly or even fraudulently padded claims. To increase a jury's esti-
mation of pain and suffering damages, claims may include unneeded medical
expenses, and unnecessary wage losses. According to the Rand Institute for
Civil Justice, pain and suffering awards based on the amount of economic loss
incurred for health care, which is often covered by private or public insurance,
result in huge and unnecessary health care expenditures.
Granted, for those truly injured victims who are able to survive the lengthy
process, a large monetary award, substantially enhanced with pain and suffering
damages, may offer some relief. But in the end, even high awards will often not
alleviate the emotional and economic hardship that plaintiffs may feel, not only
during their long battle for compensation, but for the remainder of their lives.
The data compiled by tort scholars and the stories of successful but disillusioned
plaintiffs demonstrate that the current tort scheme does not adequately address
malpractice claims.
III. A CuRPE?
Among the possible alternatives to the current tort regime, two are often men-
tioned: enterprise liability and no-fault insurance.27 However, there are flaws
with both of these reforms that render them less effective than some would have
it. A most serious objection to much tort reform, including enterprise liability, is
that it is still based on fault and still allows for pain and suffering damages.
21. Weiler, supra note 20, at 915.
22. Michael B. Van Scoy-Mosher, An Rxfor the Malpractice Explosion, L.A. TIMES, June 28, 1983, at 4
(reviewing D. FLASTER, MALPRACTICE: A GUIDE TO THE LEGAL RIGHTS OF PATIENTS AND DOCTORS (1983)).
23. BELL, supra note 15, at 42.
24. BELL, supra note 15, at 43.
25. BELL, supra note 15, at 64.
26. BELL, supra note 15, at 163.
27. COMMITTEE ON QUALITY OF HEALTH CARE IN AMERICA, INSTITUTE OF MEDICINE, To ERR IS HUMAN 1
(Linda T. Kohn, Janet Corrigan et al. eds., 1999).
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These two variables are the principal problems of the current system. As long as
these variables are retained, reform efforts will remain unnecessarily futile.
As to a no-fault system, a neo-no-fault "Early Offers" plan, first proposed by
the author of this article, is similar to a no-fault scheme in that compensation is
paid periodically as economic losses accrue, and non-economic losses such as
pain and suffering are excluded. Compensation is also delivered more swiftly
with less hassle than under the current tort system. This Early Offer plan differs
considerably from traditional no-fault regimes such as workers' compensation
and no-fault auto insurance statutes. Early Offers avoids the impractical task of
pre-accident definitions of when no-fault payments kick in for adverse results
from medical care. 8 It does this by simply creating a device whereby any defen-
dant of a medical malpractice claim is given the option within 120 days after the
adverse result or after a claim is filed to make no-fault-like periodic payments of
a claimant's net economic loss. One hundred twenty days is a relatively prompt
time frame compared with the current tort system. 9
The early payment offer must cover such costs as medical and rehabilitation
expenses as well as wage losses (beyond any collateral sources such as health or
disability insurance already payable to the claimant), and reasonable hourly fees
for the claimant's lawyer. Given the quick resolution of cases disposed of by
Early Offers, the attorney's fees would be much less than the normal thirty to
forty percent. However, no compensation would be paid for non-economic loss-
es such as pain and suffering. A crucial feature of the plan is that a defendant
who promptly offers to pay a claimant's net economic losses forecloses further
pursuit of a normal tort claim for non-economic losses. In this way, the parties
forgo the insurmountable problems mentioned above of separating ex ante the
adverse effects caused by health care from the patient's presenting complaint.
On the other side of the coin, victims can turn down offers, but only if the defen-
dant's injurious acts are proven beyond a reasonable doubt, or at least by clear
and convincing evidence, to have been intentional or wanton. Thus, a crucial ele-
ment of the tort system's deterrence mechanism is retained. That is, needy plain-
tiffs can still win suitably large monetary awards under the Early Offers model
through the recovery of both economic and non-economic damages in egregious
cases of medical misconduct.
To qualify as an "early offer" under the plan, the offer must be made in accor-
dance with a formula for calculating damages for economic losses similar to
those paid under no-fault schemes that would be set forth in an Early Offers
statute passed either at the state or federal level. In fact, the Early Offers plan
has already been incorporated in a piece of federal legislation proposed by
Republican Senator Mitch McConnell of Kentucky." Because the early offer
compensates only for actual economic damages, some injured claimants such as
28. See O'Connell supra note 16, at 307-18 (describing the impractical task ofpre-accident definitions).
29. BELL, supra note 15, at 213 (The plan can be drafted to apply to other claims than medical malprac-
tice as well, such as product liability.).
30. See S. 1861, 104th Cong. (1996); COMMITTEE FOR ECONOMIC DEV., BREAKING THE LITIGATION HABIT:
ECONOMIC INCENTIVES FOR LEGAL REFORM (2000), available at http:// www.ced.org/projects/legal.htm, at 18
(hereinafter CED).
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the elderly, homemakers, or the unemployed, might not stand to receive substan-
tial payment under the system. Hence, compensation for economic damages
alone could not sufficiently deter defendants in the event one of these individuals
were injured. However, a simple solution to this problem would be to stipulate
an alternative of a substantial minimum amount for all early offers covering seri-
ous injuries of these individuals, which should be rigorously defined in the
statute. 1
Because health care providers would not be required to define the conditions
under which they would make an early offer before the adverse event occurred,
the question arises: When would a defendant be inclined to make such an offer?
One obvious example of when not to make an offer would be when a defendant
determines that the claimant was never even treated by the practitioner or med-
ical center in question. Apart from such stark cases, the health care provider
might not believe the accident was its fault, and thus would be prompted to cal-
culate what it would likely cost to pay the claimant periodically for the net med-
ical expenses and lost wages brought about by the injury. If that sum turns out to
be less than what the defendant would pay to defense lawyers, plus its likely tort
exposure--with the whole panoply of possible repayment of collateral sources
and non-economic damages figuring into the equation--the defendant might well
decide that it is worthwhile to make the early offer. Given the huge costs of
defending tort cases and the gamble of having to pay large sums already paid by
collateral sources, as well as for intangible losses, many defendants would be
prompted to pay for net economic losses, not just in cases they are sure to lose,
but even in many cases in which the issue is legitimately in doubt. One leading
defense lawyer has hypothesized that of the 250 medical malpractice cases his
large office was then defending, all in various stages of litigation, he would
advise making an early offer in 200 (or eighty percent) of those cases if such a
law were in effect. 2
Indeed, implementation of the Early Offers system would bring with it many
benefits. Perhaps most importantly, it ensures that victims can receive rapid and
essential compensation when they need it most, since the plan requires defen-
dants to make any offer early in the dispute process. Thereby, both parties avoid
protracted litigation. In addition, the Early Offers plan crucially reduces the pos-
sibility that injured parties and their counsel will interpret a settlement offer as
merely an opening bid in negotiations and as a signal that they could eventually
recover much more. Such a possibility would simply spur further litigation, with
all its attendant waste and frustrations.
A prompt offer under the plan can also reduce the transaction costs for defen-
dants (and their insurers) by paying their own lawyers for far fewer hours of
work. Indeed, early offers could be expected to be generated in-house by insur-
ers. The Insurance Services Office has estimated that insurers' legal defense
costs account for fourteen percent of total operating costs of malpractice litiga-
tion.3 However, it is not so much the insurance companies that feel the sting of
31. O'Connell, supra note 16, at 312.
32. BELL, supra note 15, at 214.
33. BELL, supra note 15, at 218.
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these high costs for legal defense in tort suits--it is the American public that must
absorb the resultant high liability premiums. Thus, the Early Offers program
should actually work to lower the cost of insurance that health care providers
need to purchase since the legal exposure of health care providers under Early
Offers would be dramatically reduced by the reductions in (1) attorneys' fees on
both sides, (2) payment for amounts already paid by collateral sources, and (3)
pain and suffering awards.
Furthermore, it can be argued that Early Offers will enhance public safety.
The need to make quick offers under the plan will encourage rapid reporting of
adverse events within an organization, since the opportunity to make a qualifying
offer can be lost if not made promptly after the adverse result or claim34 In
today's medical malpractice lawsuits, the vast majority of medical injuries are
neither the result of "wanton," nor "intentional," acts but are only some variant of
"negligence." The Early Offers system provides incentives for both the claimant
and defendant to agree to a binding early settlement. In turn, the system also
provides a key incentive for the health care provider to reveal and report any
medical mistakes that might have occurred in the course of a claimant's treat-
ment. Indeed, an Early Offers statute could require that, after an early offer is
accepted, a health care provider offer to meet with patients and/or their families
to explain as fully as feasible, the circumstances surrounding the adverse result.
Moreover, to the extent that health care providers might fear that making an early
offer under the plan would be included in the National Practitioner Data Bank,
which lists medical malpractice payments and settlements by individual practi-
tioners,3" the Early Offers statute could specify that payments made through the
Early Offers system be noted in the Practitioner Data Bank as subject to special
exonerating consideration.
Thus, implementation of the Early Offers system would help to lessen the
often myopic and counterproductive blame culture that permeates current tort
law. Early Offers would work to calm the animosities of the parties in an acci-
dent claim rather than inflaming them, as the current litigation culture now does.
It accomplishes this by giving defendants a healthy incentive to promptly
acknowledge any problems and even to discuss what happened. Under the cur-
rent adversarial tort regime, claimants rarely receive an apology, admission of
fault, or even an explanation of the adverse event.36 Many times a simple apolo-
gy or explanation by the defendant can assuage the emotions of an injured party
more effectively than a mammoth, long-delayed monetary award for pain and
suffering damages. Such open and candid discussions could provide the accident
victim with another form of valuable compensation often overlooked by the judi-
cial system--peace of mind. In fact, researchers report that feelings of forgive-
ness and compassion have been proclaimed as therapeutic for accident victims
because they reduce the anxiety and stress associated with continuing anger and
34. CED,supra note 31, at 18.
35. See O'Connell, supra note 14, at 2.
36. CED, supra note 31, at 19; see also BARRY WERTH, DAMAGES: OWE FAMILY'S LEGAL STRUGGLES IN
THE WORLD OF MEDICINE (1999).
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resentment.' The Early Offers plan induces the parties to discuss what happened
rather than forcing them to engage in the combat of the current "blame game" of
tort litigation. In so doing, Early Offers thus promotes understanding, coopera-
tion and swift compensation rather than contentious, hostile, and dilatory legal
proceedings.
In summary, Early Offers seems to be a well-suited reform in the context of
medical malpractice law. The Early Offers plan helps to create a different legal
culture in which the reporting of errors is fostered while promoting prompt and
fair compensation for injured patients. Reviewing again the mechanics of the
system, claimants have the right to deny an early offer if they think it can be
proved that the health care provider engaged in wanton or intentional miscon-
duct. Although the burden of proof is higher in such cases, if a health care
provider's level of care is so bad as to legitimately raise the question of whether
maltreatment was egregious, there would presumably exist a case where simply
paying for economic loss is not enough. Similarly, prolonged and extensive liti-
gation in such cases would seem to be worth it. Furthermore, just as health care
providers have the option to refuse to make an early offer if they do not believe a
claim is justified, patients have the option to pursue a tort claim under normal
standards of proof, care, and damages when no early offer is tendered. Finally, if
so many cases result in claims being pursued for wanton misconduct that the
Early Offers plan seems counterproductive, early offers will simply cease to be
tendered, and the system will die a natural death. However, this scenario seems
unlikely given the experience under workers' compensation laws, where few
employees are successful in suing employers for gross negligence. 8
If an Early Offers system is enacted, it might be argued that insurance rates
will rise for health care providers because many more injured patients will seek
quick settlements. Any added cost of medical malpractice insurance would then
be passed to patients. Thus, the Early Offers system, so the objection goes,
would end up costing the average American citizen more than the current tort
system.
In reply, highly questionable or smaller claims are unlikely to receive an early
offer in the first place. Remember, the offer decision rests with defendants. 9
Medical providers (and their insurers) will not make an offer unless they believe
doing so is more advantageous than paying for defense costs under the tort sys-
tem, thereby taking the risk of losing the case and ultimately repaying for dam-
ages covered by collateral sources and for large non-economic damages.4 Even
in the unlikely event of higher premiums as injured patients file more claims and
more settlements are provided under the Early Offers system, this arguably
37. Neal R. Feigenson, Merciful Damages: Some Remarks on Forgiveness, Mercy and Tort Law, 27
FoRDHAM UiB. L.J. 1633, 1647 (2000).
38. See Jason S. Johnston, Punitive Liability: A New Paradigm of Efficiency in Tort Law, 87 COLUM. L.
REV. 1385, 1411-12 (1987); Jeffrey O'Connell, Two-Tier Tort Law: Neo No-Fault & Quasi-Criminal Liability,
27 WAKE FOREST L. REv. 871, 880 (1992).
39. See Jeffrey O'Connell, Offers That Can't Be Refused, 77 Nw. U. L. REv. 589, 604-06 (1982) (No
money would be saved by encouraging claims by those not bringing them previously because the plan confines
initiating early offers to defendants.).
40. CED, supra note 31, at 20.
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would still be a vast improvement over the current legal system. Under the cur-
rent system, patients are often wrongly compensated (if at all) either too much or
too little, and always too late. Given the high rate of iatrogenic injuries, 41 if
injured people who are clearly wronged are compensated expeditiously for their
genuine economic losses, and much less money is expended for transaction costs
of litigation and payment of less essential non-economic damages, the result can
be viewed as a real gain for society.
42
41. O'Connell, supra note 16, at 23-24.
42. Id; see also generally O'Connell, supra note 14. (The Early Offers solution would arguably apply
much better to HMOs than either the status quo of trying to insulate them from medical malpractice claims or,
on the other hand, expanding the presently unworkable malpractice regime to apply to HMOs.).
